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Abstract Selectivity of migration varies significantly between ethnic/origin country
groups, and between the destination countries which these groups have migrated to.
Yet, little comparative research has measured empirically how selective different
migrant groups are in multiple destination countries, nor has research studied
whether the selectivity of migration is related to the magnitude of ethnic inequalities
among the children of migrants in Western societies. We present an empirical
measure of educational selectivity of migrants from many different origin countries
having migrated to ten different destination countries. We examine whether
selective migration of a particular ethnic group in a particular destination country is
related to the gap between their children’s and native children’s educational out-
comes. We find that the disadvantage in educational outcomes between the second
generation and their peers from majority populations is smaller for ethnic groups
that are more positively selected in terms of educational attainment. We also find
some evidence that the effect of selective migration is moderated by the integration
policies or tracking arrangements in the educational system in the destination
country.
Keywords Ethnicity  Educational inequality  Migration  Selective
migration  Integration policies
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1 Introduction
Processes of first- and second-generation integration vary strongly between migrants
of different origin countries and between the countries they have migrated to. One
domain of integration concerns the educational attainment of the children of
immigrants: are second-generation children of migrants disadvantaged in the
education system compared to children of the majority population in the host
country? Some groups, such as Asian migrants to the USA, are known to have
exceptionally good performances compared to the majority populations, while other
groups, such as children of the Mediterranean labor migrants to Europe of the
1960s–1970s, do much worse (Heath et al. 2008).
One potential source of these stark differences among immigrant groups across
different countries has been hardly addressed in the comparative literature: the
selectivity of the migrant population. A number of single-country studies have
shown that emigrants are positively selected on educational attainment compared to
the homestayers (e.g., Feliciano 2005a; Bertoli et al. 2013; Ichou 2014). Others have
examined selectivity of migration for a large number of countries, but have not
examined the consequences for the integration into the educational system of the
children of immigrants (Brücker and Defoort 2009; Belot and Hatton 2012).
Given that parental education is one of the most important predictors of
children’s educational attainment, it is likely that positive selection has implications
for immigrants’ integration into the host society. Moreover, selectivity of migration
may partially explain the significant differences in the educational outcomes across
ethnic groups in various destination countries. Especially, second-generation
children’s educational achievement and attainment may benefit from a community
that is ‘positively selected’ in terms of education, over and above the positive effects
generated by the educational attainment of parents. Ethnic communities are defined
here as the combination of origin country and destination country (Van Tubergen
et al. 2004). It is likely that positively selected communities generate particularly
high aspirations for children. These aspirations may translate into more ambitious
educational choices and achievements, as argued by Kao and Tienda (1995).
Furthermore, while selectivity of migration may contribute to our understanding
of variations in the educational disadvantage of different immigrant groups, it also is
plausible that its importance varies across destination countries. Positively selected
migrant communities may be less disadvantaged compared to neutrally or
negatively selected communities, but the magnitude of these differences are likely
to be modified by destination country institutions. In some destination countries,
low-educated communities may be at a greater disadvantage than in other countries,
depending on the types of integration policies or the nature of the educational
system.
In this paper, we take up the challenge to study these comparative research
problems. We present an index of selective migration into ten Western host
societies, across 34 distinct ethnic groups, totaling 81 ‘communities.’ We examine
whether selectivity of migration is related to the extent to which second-generation
groups are disadvantaged across various educational outcomes, in comparison with
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majority populations. We then examine whether the educational disadvantage of
negatively selected migrant groups is particularly found in destination countries
with unfavorable integration policies or strongly diversified educational systems.
Doing so, our approach follows a research line that emphasizes that integration and
assimilation of migrants (and their children) is a function of the migration context
(Van Tubergen et al. 2004; Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005; Crul and Schneider
2010; Hillmert 2013). Integration is affected by characteristics of the destination
country (such as migrant integration policies and educational systems) and of the
community of migrant groups in a particular destination country. Moreover, we
study whether destination country institutions have differential effects on different
groups of migrants. These interaction effects between the selectivity of ethnic
communities and destination country policies have not been studied before.
We use a harmonized dataset comprising the best available national datasets to
study ethnic educational inequality, brought together for a large comparative project
(Heath and Brinbaum 2014). For the ten destination countries, we harmonized
existing data that cover three outcomes in various crucial stages of the secondary
school career: (1) the performance in standardized test scores in the first stage of
secondary education; (2) whether a vocational or academic route is chosen at upper
secondary education; and (3) whether upper secondary education has been
completed. Our data thus enable the study of multiple outcomes in the school
career, instead of only test scores which are the major object of study in the existing
literature. The study of multiple educational outcomes has been called for by Alba
et al. (2011). We can control for parental education and occupation in order to find
‘net effects’ of ethnicity in comparison with ‘similar’ children of majority
populations on all these outcomes. Moreover, a unique feature of our data is that we
construct a ‘net difference index’ of selectivity of migration with regard to human
capital for all ethnic groups in ten host countries and associate it with racial/ethnic
educational inequality. While following the approach of Feliciano (2005a), our
measure is unique because it covers multiple host societies instead of one, which
enables us to study migrants in a multiple-origin multiple-destination design.
2 Selective Migration in Context: Theory and Hypotheses on Second-
Generation Immigrants’ Education
2.1 Selective Migration
A number of studies have examined whether immigrant communities are positively
or negatively selected in comparison with the non-migrants in the origin country
(Borjas 1987; Bertoli et al. 2013; Chiswick 1999; Ichou 2014). Migrants are
reported to be positively self-selected on educational attainment, motivation, ability,
and effort, compared to the homestayers. Even if the (positive) returns to education
are equal between origin and destination countries, economic theory would predict
positive selection on education given a fixed amount of relocation costs for all
migrants (Chiswick 1999). Yet, societal circumstances (of both the origin and
destination countries) can have effects on the extent to which there is selectivity of
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migration. If the returns to human capital are higher in destination countries,
selectivity will be stronger, and selectivity is stronger if there are wealth or income
constraints (as, for instance, imposed by larger geographical distance or other
obstacles between origin and destination) (Bertoli et al. 2013; Borjas 1987). In line
with this economic model, Van Tubergen et al. (2004) indirectly studied selectivity
of migration for each immigrant group in a great number of destination countries by
comparing the level of income inequality between the destination and origin
countries. A comparatively high level of inequality in the destination country would
be indicative of positive selection on income-generating characteristics (skills,
education), as the returns to human capital are higher in high-inequality countries.
Essential of this literature is that, both between and within destination countries,
there is a wide variety of selectivity between migrant groups. Observed levels of
selectivity of migrant groups in different host societies result from two distinct
processes. First, some people may be more likely to migrate abroad than others
(selectivity), and second, migrants choose countries based on the expected returns to
their skills (sorting, Grogger and Hanson 2011). A wide variety in educational
selectivity has been demonstrated for the USA (Feliciano 2005a). For almost all of
the 32 immigrant communities that were studied, selection in terms of educational
attainment was positive (except for Puerto Rico), but much less positive for central
American immigrants to the USA than for Europeans and Asians. Factors associated
with selectivity were geographical distance to the USA (more selectivity if the
distance is larger) and the average level of education in the home country (less
selectivity in more highly educated origin countries).
Selective migration can be expected to be associated with immigrant integration
and assimilation. For the USA, it has been demonstrated that positive selection
(indicated by low inequality in the origin country and larger geographical distance)
was related to higher earnings of first- and second-generation migrants (Borjas
1993). Moreover, the integration outcomes are not restricted to migrants themselves,
but can be transmitted to the next generation of children born in the destination
country. Feliciano (2005b) found that college enrollment of second-generation
students was higher for more strongly educationally selected communities.
Moreover, differences in selectivity accounted for differences in college completion
rates between ethnic groups, particularly for the high rates among Asian
immigrants. Kao and Tienda (1995: 5) explained the high achievement of second-
generation Asians by ‘‘their parents’ optimism about their socioeconomic prospects
[which] leads youth to behave in ways that promote educational success.’’ Thus,
selectively migrated groups are likely to have resources in their communities
beyond parental educational levels, which are likely to help the structural
integration of the second generation.
Much less is known about the relevance of migration selectivity on integration in
cross-national comparative perspective. In the study of Van Tubergen et al. (2004),
the ratio of income inequalities in destination and origin countries was positively
associated with immigrants’ integration in the labor market, suggesting that high-
inequality countries attract especially high-ability migrants. Also, academic
achievement of children of immigrants to traditional migration societies with strict
immigration policies (such as the USA and Canada) is higher than of immigrants to
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more recent host societies with more relaxed policies regarding the human capital of
migrants (Levels et al. 2008). That same study also showed that (parental)
educational disadvantage of first-generation immigrants relative to natives of the
destination country harms academic achievement of school-aged immigrants’
children. Thus, poorly educated immigrant communities are harmful to children’s
educational performance, independent of the socioeconomic status of the family.
Another indirect approach to assessing selectivity is to compare student test
scores of migrant groups with the test scores of non-migrants in the origin country
(Dronkers and De Heus 2010). For many immigrant groups, it appeared that their
children performed worse than the majority children in the origin country, a finding
that persisted after controlling for social class differences. However, it is uncertain
whether such differences result from selective migration, or from difficulties in
completing achievement tests in a non-native language (Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen
2012). It is somewhat worrying that most immigrant groups are, according to this
approach, negatively selected, while educational selectivity is typically positive in
other approaches.
We expect that more positively selected immigrant communities have lower
disadvantages in education (relative to the majority populations in the destination
countries) in comparison with more negatively selected immigrant communities
(hypothesis 1).
2.2 Destination Country Institutions
While comparative studies have shown some indirect evidence for the relevance of
selective migration on integration, to the best of our knowledge, no earlier
comparative study has directly measured the implications of selective migration for
children’s educational attainment. A comparative approach is highly relevant,
because destination countries vary significantly in how immigrants are incorporated
into host societies. It allows us to investigate whether selectivity has different
effects in migrant-friendly societies compared to more restrictive host societies.
Various scholars have drawn attention to the way in which host country policies
and practices may affect the ‘warmth of the welcome’ afforded migrants and their
prospects for successful integration, particularly focussing on economic integration
(Reitz 1998; Portes and Zhou 1993; Heath and Cheung 2007). Such policies include
anti-discrimination legislation, access to employment, citizenship and long-term
residence, and practical assistance for recently arrived migrants and can be thought
of as policies which tend to favor the inclusion rather than exclusion of migrant
communities. A special form of integration policies are multicultural policies, an
overlapping but conceptually distinct set of policies which facilitate recognition of
ethno-religious groups and their distinctive cultures (Koopmans et al. 2005;
Koopmans 2010; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Wright and Bloemraad 2012;
Bloemraad and Wright 2014). One perspective stresses that multicultural policies
would improve the integration of migrants into host societies (Banting and
Kymlicka 2006; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). However, others have argued that
multicultural policies may in fact stigmatize migrant groups and hence deteriorate
their integration in society (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012; Koopmans et al. 2005).
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Maybe both effects are in operation, leading to a nonexistent association between
multicultural policies and the level of disadvantage. It is clear that comparative
studies disagree on the relevance of host country institutions such as integration
policies for educational integration (Rothon et al. 2009; Hillmert 2013). To make
progress in this discussion, it is relevant to study the relation between integration
policies and the relevance of selectivity of migration.
It is likely that the extent to which selective migration is associated with
educational disadvantages depends on migrant-friendly integration policies.
Warmth-of-welcome policies may be particularly important for children of
‘negatively selected’ migrant communities, i.e., with lower levels of human capital
than the non-migrating homestayers. These groups are often targeted by integration-
friendly policies. Based on this reasoning, we can formulate the hypothesis that the
association between educational selectivity of immigrant communities and
children’s reduced educational disadvantage is weaker in societies with inclusive
migrant integration policies (hypothesis 2). In those migrant-friendly societies,
strongly positively selected immigrant communities are less helpful for children’s
educational attainment than in destination countries more hostile to immigrants.
A second destination country institution relevant for ethnic educational
inequality concerns the tracking of the educational system in the host societies
(Cobb-Clark et al. 2012; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Entorf and Lauk 2008; Griga
and Hadjar 2014). Education in the destination country is one of the key institutions
that determine how context helps or hinders migrants’ children’s integration (Cobb-
Clark et al. 2012; Crul and Schneider 2009, 2010). Educational systems vary
strongly in the timing of selection into different school types. In Germany, students
are selected into different school types, often in different school organizations, at
the age of 10. In the Netherlands, this happens at the age of 12. These are early
selecting countries. On the other hand, in countries like Sweden and Canada,
selection into different school types occurs much later.1
Early tracking magnifies inequalities in educational achievement and school type
enrollment because second-generation pupils are given ‘little time to pull
themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position’ (Crul and Vermeulen
2003: 979).
Tracking is likely to have different effects for different groups of migrants,
depending on their human capital selectivity. Through mechanisms of peer effects,
resource allocation, and teacher quality, early tracking is particularly harmful for the
educational opportunities of students placed in the less demanding tracks. Students
in the higher tracks may benefit from early selection. How does tracking affect
students of different levels of selection on the basis of human capital? A first line of
reasoning is that tracking is particularly harmful to disadvantaged groups, so
negatively selected immigrant communities (hypothesis 3a). More positively
selected migrant groups may, according to this perspective, be less harmed by
early tracking; also in early tracking systems, they may find their way to higher
1 Of course in the USA, forms of within-school tracking exist that are associated with inequalities, but
these are typically by subject, and by year, whereas between-school tracking as found in Germany or the
Netherlands happens for the full curriculum for a number of years, in separate school buildings and school
organizations leading to a different qualification level.
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levels of achievement and attainment. Support for this reasoning may come from the
consistently high levels of performance of Asian-origin students across many
societies (Heath and Brinbaum 2014).
However, an alternative perspective is that children with a lot of learning
potential and aspirations (i.e., coming from highly motivated and positively
selectively migrated communities) will be particularly harmed by early tracking.
They are the ones for whom early tracking limits the time to demonstrate their
learning potential. For unselective, more disadvantaged students, tracking may be
less influential on their educational career, as they would have had a lower
performance independent of whether they are tracked early or not. Tracking would
then effectively constrain people with high aspirations but initial low achievement,
whereas non-selective systems allow them to continue. An alternative hypothesis
therefore is that tracking reduces the positive influence of positive selection, as it
will prevent positively selected groups from following their high aspirations
(Waters et al. 2013) (hypothesis 3b).
Although we do not explicitly formulate hypotheses on differences in the
statistical relationships across the educational career, it is possible to speculate on
this issue. From one perspective, it can be expected that various indicators of
disadvantage have stronger effects early in the school career. Many studies have
reported reduced effects across the career, for two reasons: because there is an
increased homogeneity of students after rounds of selection in the education
trajectory and because children are more independent of their parents’ structural
position at higher ages (Breen and Jonsson 2005). If the effects (which are our
dependent variables) are smaller, this translates into lower variances in our
dependent variable, potentially leading to lower statistical relationships. However,
given that we study unconditional models, meaning that there is no increased
homogeneity on unobservables across the outcomes, it could also be that institutions




Our analysis concentrates on gaps in educational outcomes between the second
generation and majority groups. The second generation is defined as the group that
is born in the destination country, but with at least one parent born abroad. If one
parent was born abroad, the origin country of that parent was used to identify ethnic
group. This means that we define ethnic background based on country of origin of
the parent(s), which, we realize, can be a simplification if multiple ethnic groups can
originate from one origin country.
We focus on ten host countries in Europe and North America: Belgium, Canada,
England, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
USA. We brought together expertise from these countries in a European research
project funded under the EQUALSOC Network of Excellence (a Sixth Framework
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Programme funded by the European Commission) and reported in Heath and
Brinbaum (2014). We included countries where a sizeable second generation has
already gone through the complete school system. The ten countries have all
become increasingly diverse in the past decades, and the set of countries includes
important variations with regard to selective migration, socioeconomic origin and
destination country institutions. For reasons of data availability, for Switzerland, we
only included the first outcome (test scores). We maintained Switzerland because
our team included expertise on Switzerland, and because including it is relevant to
study the impact of school tracking, one of our contextual variables.
We selected nationally representative datasets to study ethnic educational
inequalities at various stages in the educational career and focused on what the
national experts considered the best available datasets to study ethnic educational
inequality in their country. We focus on three outcomes in the secondary school
phase: (1) test scores at the first stage of secondary education (roughly at the age of
13–16), (2) enrollment in vocational or general/academic tracks in upper secondary
education, and (3) the completion of upper secondary education. Based on available
data and national expertise to analyze the first step in the analysis (see below), we
were able to collect data on ten host countries, including traditional receiving
societies (e.g., Canada, USA), countries with immigration from former colonies
(e.g., France, England), countries with a major ‘guest worker’ source of immigration
(e.g., Germany, the Netherlands), and countries with a large refugee population
(e.g., Sweden). Moreover, these countries differ in substantial ways with regard to
their institutions that may be influential on the role of selective migration. The data
we brought together include cohort studies of educational or birth cohorts, register
data, and cross-sectional data. This approach has the advantage that the best datasets
are chosen that have been used for national studies of ethnic and social inequalities
in education, many of which are longitudinal and collected by national statistical
agencies. A disadvantage is that the data were initially not collected for comparative
purposes. Datasets varied in some notable respects between countries. For Sweden,
Finland, and Belgium, population-level data were obtained from official registers,
while for other countries, cross-sectional data were combined with educational
cohort studies. Nevertheless, all these datasets were nationally representative. Given
that the data came from various sources (including national registers), there was no
possibility to bring the individual-level data together.
Not all educational outcomes are available for all ten host countries. See
‘‘Appendix 1’’ for an overview of the dependent variables that have been studied per
country and of the ethnic groups that have been compared to majority populations.
‘‘Appendix 2’’ lists all the datasets that have been used.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
We use a two-step procedure to assess the relationships between the contextual
variables and ethnic educational inequality. Ethnic educational inequality is
measured by the net regression coefficient of ethnic group, for each ethnic group
and each destination country separately, on the outcome under study. The first step
consists of country-by-country regressions on the three outcomes, controlling for
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family situation (single parenthood), social background (parents’ education and
social class), and gender. These models are unconditional models; for instance, the
chance to obtain a full secondary-level qualification is estimated for the whole
sample, not just for people that have successfully completed lower secondary
education.2
Of these regression models, the coefficients displaying the difference in the
outcome of a particular ethnic group with children from the majority population are
saved, as well as the standard errors of these coefficients. With regard to test results,
these coefficients are taken from ordinary least squares regression models. For the
other two outcomes, which are dichotomous, we have taken the probit coefficients.
Negative net coefficients would thus indicate a disadvantage of that particular ethnic
group for that particular educational outcome compared to similar children of
majority populations, and positive coefficients represent net advantages.
This paper reports about the second step of the regression analysis, which relates
the strength of the (dis)advantage of second-generation students to contextual
variables such as integration policies that are described below. The dependent
variables are, thus, the coefficients of ethnic background predicting the educational
outcome, which indicate the level of (dis)advantage of the particular ethnic group
relative to the majority population, controlled for socioeconomic background
(occupational group and both parents’ education). These models are known as
slopes as outcomes models or two-step multilevel models (Achen 2005; Bryan and
Jenkins 2016; Gebel and Giesecke 2011, 2016).
These coefficients measure the ethnic gap of ethnic group coming from origin
country j in destination country k (relative to the majority population), which we call
djk. We estimate the size of the gap as a function of variables at the level of
destination country k and of the combination of origin and destination countries
{j,k}, and of an interaction term between these two different types of variables.
Equation (1) describes the second-step multilevel regression model, with ethnic
groups nested in host societies (estimated separately for each educational outcome):
djk ¼ aþ bXk þ cZjk þ sXkZjk þ fk þ ejk ð1Þ
Since our dependent variable djk is an estimated coefficient rather than the true
population-level parameter, we take into account the degree of uncertainty of the
coefficients by weighting. We apply the weighting scheme proposed by Borjas and
Sueyoshi (1994), which takes into account the two error components that exist in
two-stage models (see Huber et al. 2005). The first component is the variance of the
coefficients estimated in the first-stage regressions. This variance is easily derived
on the basis of the standard errors of the first-stage coefficients, in such a way that
more precise estimates get greater weights than more imprecise estimates. The
second component is the residual variance from the second-stage regressions before
adding weights—that is, the residuals of this model net of the variance resulting
from the first-stage coefficients. This second component is necessary because the
macro-level variables do not explain the whole variance between countries.
2 One of the dependent variables (enrolment in vocational or academic track within upper secondary
education) is conditional on being enrolled in upper secondary education.
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Due to the relatively low number of cases (i.e., ethnic communities), we are
careful not to include too many explanatory variables at once. Therefore, each
analysis is built up in steps. The main predictor variables are the selective migration
index (see below), which is subsequently interacted with two destination country
variables: an indicator for multicultural policies, and an indicator of early tracking
in the educational system. We control for language similarity of the origin and host
societies, as it is shown to be related to both the selectivity of migration (Brücker
and Defoort 2009) and educational attainment (Heath et al. 2008).
The dataset has ethnic group by destination country as its unit of analysis. With
32 ethnic groups in ten countries (including an ‘other’ and ‘mixed’ category in each
of the countries), the total N lies between 57 and 80 (depending on the specific
educational outcome). Figure 1 shows the kernel distributions of the net effects on
the three educational outcomes. It can be seen that both negative and positive net
effects are found in the data. In ‘‘Appendix 4’’, we show models on the subset of the
countries that are available for all three outcome variables. In the conclusion and
discussion, we reflect on the robustness of our findings in light of these replications
on smaller datasets.
3.3 Selectivity of Migration
We follow the approach of Feliciano (2005a) in measuring selectivity of migration.
A selectivity index is constructed to indicate how the educational level of migrants
compares to their origin countries’ populations from the same birth cohort (in order
to take account of the fact that educational levels have been rising rapidly in many
of the ‘origin’ countries just as it has in the Western destination countries). Data on
(first-generation) fathers’ completed education are readily available in the datasets
used in the first-step analysis.3 The host country data are taken from nationally
representative data among children, so first-generation migrants without children are
not represented. For the non-migrant population of origin countries, data were
gathered from several (cross-) national surveys. Like Feliciano, we use the net
difference index (NDI) introduced by Lieberson (1976, 1980) to calculate a measure
of selectivity. This index enables us to compare the entire frequency distribution of
completed educational level by migrant fathers to that of non-migrant males of a
comparable age-group in the origin country.4 Its logic is to sum up the percentages
of migrants in the destination country that completed a similar, lower, and higher
educational level in comparison with their non-migrant counterparts in the origin
country. The sum score represents how often the educational level of a migrant will
3 We used fathers’ education as their educational attainment is arguably a better measure of migration
motivation than mothers’ education, for most of the developing countries in the generations studied.
4 For all origin countries, we take males born between 1940 and 1964 as the comparison group. As the
origin country, we of course prefer to use the most common origin country of an ethnic group in the
destination country. The selection of the origin country, however, also depends on availability of survey
data. In a few cases, a proxy having a similar level of human development, as measured by the United
Nation’s Human Development Index, was used because no data were available on that particular country:
the Dominican Republic as proxy for Caribbean migrants in France, and Tanzania for migrants from
Africa’s Horn in Sweden. See ‘‘Appendix 3’’ for details on the data used.








































Fig. 1 Net effects of ethnic background on educational outcomes (djk)
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exceed that of a non-migrant, or the other way around. The more positive the sum
score, the more the educational level of a migrant group exceeds that of a non-
migrant as opposed to the other way around. A negative sum, in turn, indicates that
migrants more often have a lower educational level than non-migrants. The
selectivity index ranges from - 1 (all migrants are less educated than non-migrants)
to ? 1 (all migrants are more educated than non-migrants). A score of 0 means that
the educational distributions of migrants and non-migrants are equal.
Selectivity cannot be calculated for the ‘mixed’ and ‘other’ ethnic groups since
these categories have no specific origin country. For the ‘other’ category, the mean
selectivity index of the destination country is imputed. For the ‘mixed’ category, we
impute a selectivity of 0, equating this category to the majority group. It should be
noted that this measure only assesses selectivity with regard to educational
attainment. Other forms of selectivity, for instance on the basis of intelligence,
motivation, or economic resources, are not explicitly measured, while these could
be influential on the level of disadvantage in immigrant communities.
Figure 2 shows the selectivity index calculated for each origin group in each of
the destination countries. The figure shows that selectivity varies strongly between
ethnic groups within countries, and within ethnic groups between countries. For
instance, the Turkish first-generation migrants living in Germany are more
positively selected than Turkish migrants in the Netherlands or Belgium (while
Zuccotti et al. 2017 showed overall positive selection of Turkish migrants in six
European destination countries). Moreover, in line with Canadian policy, it is
evident that all migrant groups that were examined are positively selected (i.e., more
highly educated than the homestayers in the origin countries). All other countries
have both positively selected and negatively selected migrant groups.
The control variable language similarity between origin and destination countries
is measured as a dummy variable where a score of 1 signifies similarity of
languages. Ethnic groups subsumed under the ‘other’ category are given a 0. The
‘mixed’ category is scored 1.
3.4 Destination Country Institutions: Integration Policies and Early
Tracking
At the level of the destination country, one central variable measures the extent to
which the country has policies aimed at promoting migrant integration. We use the
Migrant Integration Policy Index of 2010 (MIPEX III, MPG 2011), which can be
thought of as an overall index of the inclusiveness of host country institutions; the
MIPEX index aims to ‘create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’
opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments’ commitment to
integration’ (MPG 2011: 6). On the MIPEX Web site, the aims of the index are
more elaborately described as follows: ‘MIPEX measures policies that promote
integration in all societies. Integration in both social and civic terms rests on the
concept of equal opportunities for all. In socio-economic terms, migrants must have
equal opportunities to lead just as dignified, independent and active lives as the rest
of the population. In civic terms, all residents can commit themselves to mutual
rights and responsibilities on the basis of equality. When migrants feel secure,
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confident and welcome, they are able to invest in their new country of residence and
make valued contributions to society. Over time, migrants can take up more
opportunities to participate, more rights, more responsibilities and, if they wish, full
national citizenship.’5 Using expert surveys and policy assessments, seven
dimensions of integration policies are quantified: labor market mobility, family
reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to national-
ity, anti-discrimination. Countries are scored according to the extent to which
migrants have equal opportunities as the rest of the population. It can be thought of
as a measure of the overall ‘warmth of the welcome.’ It should be noted that some
elements of MIPEX may be less relevant for migrants within the European Union,
as they are entitled to free movement and residence. Nevertheless, other elements
such as entitlement to full national citizenship and rights to participate can also vary
with regard to European migrants and their families, depending on the host country.
It is important to note that the explicit focus is on policies, not on factual
integration levels. We have included the total MIPEX score across all dimensions,
rather than focus on education policies alone, because the reduction in educational
disadvantages is likely affected by broader sets of policies to integration of families,
including their labor market, political and civic integration.6 The MIPEX index
correlates strongly with multiculturalism indicators (Koopmans et al. 2012).7
The tracking of the educational system is measured by a standardized scale based
on age of first selection, the length of the differentiated curriculum, and the number
of school types available for 15-year old students (taken from OECD reports and
Brunello and Checchi 2007, see Bol and Van de Werfhorst 2013; Bol et al. 2014).
Factor scores of an underlying factor were calculated and standardized with a mean
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, taken over the maximum number of countries
available in the source data. Summarizing different indicators of tracking into one
index is important, as together they indicate the timing (i.e., at which age), duration
(which proportion of the compulsory years of education), and form of tracking (i.e.,
in how many tracks students are separated). Regression diagnostics of the
association between tracking and the slope of family background on student
achievement are more supportive of the composite index than of the separate
underlying indicators [Authors]. It should be noted that the tracking index classifies
educational systems particularly with regard to differentiation in the first stage of
secondary education, thus before the outcome that we study of whether children
enroll the academic or vocational track in upper secondary education.
Table 1 shows the scores on all the contextual variables, averaged across ethnic
groups within host countries. Regarding selectivity of migration, we see that the
average selectivity is larger than zero in all ten destination countries, indicating
5 www.mipex.eu/methodology (last accessed June 26, 2015).
6 Although the MIPEX index is available since 2007, we had to use the 2010 index because otherwise not
all countries could be used in our analyses.
7 We also examined the multiculturalism index of 2000, an index created by Banting and Kymlicka
(2006) to measure the degree to which policies toward immigrants are multicultural in the sense that they
‘‘extend some level of public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express
their distinct identities and practices’’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Results with this measurement are
very similar to the ones presented here. These results are available upon request.
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positive selection on educational attainment of the first-generation migrants relative
to the homestayers. As one would expect based on selective immigration policies,
the highest value is found in Canada, where the average selectivity is 0.406. A
number of countries have an intermediate selectivity index of around 0.10, including
England, Finland, Sweden, and the USA. Then, countries that adopted many ‘guest
workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) have lower
selectivity scores.
Language similarity is highest in France and England, countries where many
migrants from former colonies moved to. The migrant integration policy index is
highest for Sweden and also comparatively high in Finland, the Netherlands, and
Belgium. In France, Germany, and Switzerland, migration integration policies are
less inclusive. Educational tracking is highest in the German educational system,
where students are typically selected around the age of 10 for three separate school
types. Also Belgium and the Netherlands score high on tracking, with selection
happening around the age of 12, for separate school careers for multiple years. Less
tracking is found in the comprehensive schooling systems in Scandinavia, England,
Canada, and the USA.
4 Results
The outcomes of our two-step multilevel models with additional clustering of
migrant groups within countries are shown in Table 2. The table lists five models
for each of the three educational outcomes. First, we start with a model with only
selective migration and language similarity. Then, the migration policy index is
added (model 2) plus interaction terms with selectivity of migration (model 3).
Then, in models 4–5, the migration policy index is replaced with tracking; first the









Belgium 0.043 0.250 6.7 1.041
Canada 0.406 0.333 7.2 - 1.315
England 0.101 0.625 5.7 - 1.078
Finland 0.120 0.125 6.9 - 0.930
France 0.058 0.667 5.1 - 0.477
Germany 0.026 0.125 5.7 1.789
The Netherlands 0.038 0.250 6.8 0.971
Sweden 0.101 0.048 8.3 - 1.058
Switzerland 0.040 0.143 4.3 - 0.024
USA 0.093 0.400 6.2 - 1.315
These statistics are unweighted for group sizes
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main effect of the variable at the destination country level is inserted, after which
interaction term is added.
The first outcome is ethnic educational inequality in student test scores. Table 2
shows that selectivity of migration is positively associated with the coefficient of
ethnic background relative to the majority population, in line with hypothesis 1.
Given the value of the constant, the average disadvantage of unselective groups
coming from countries with a different language is - 0.173 standard deviations in
test scores. If selectivity increases, the gap is reduced and could turn even into an
advantage (given the maximum score of selectivity of, roughly, 0.7). Language
similarity is also associated with reduced disadvantages, although the coefficient is
not statistically significant.
In model 2 where the MIPEX migrant integration policy index is added, the
coefficient of language similarity is increased and turns into significance, while the
positive coefficient for selectivity of migration gets weaker, but also stays
significant. The MIPEX is positively associated with the ethnicity coefficient,
meaning that disadvantage in student test scores is lower in countries with more
favorable migrant integration policies.
Model 3 adds the interaction term between MIPEX and selectivity of migration,
but that turned out to be irrelevant and statistically insignificant (falsifying
hypothesis 2). So, while migrant integration policies are associated with lower
disadvantages among migrants relative to majority populations, this relationship is
highly similar across ethnic groups of different levels of selectivity.
Model 4 replaces the MIPEX index with the tracking index of the educational
system. The overall effect of tracking is negative; in more strongly tracked
educational systems, the average level of disadvantage of ethnic groups is larger
than in countries with comprehensive schooling systems. Model 5 shows that the
negative effect of tracking gets even more negative for more strongly selected
migrant groups—a finding in line with hypothesis 3b. The interaction term is pretty
strong, but the interaction effect is not replicated if we only focus on countries for
which we study all three dependent variables (Table 6 of Appendix). It is replicated,
however, if only European countries are analyzed (Table 7 of Appendix).
The second panel of Table 2 shows results of an analysis of ethnic differences in
the choice for general/academic forms of upper secondary education, relative to
vocational education. As already seen in Fig. 2, the overall level of disadvantage is
smaller than with test scores, and in fact many ethnic groups have a net advantage
over children of the majority population with similar socioeconomic backgrounds.
The intercept has a positive value, indicating an average advantage for children
from non-selective communities from non-native-speaking origin countries (i.e.,
overrepresentation of second-generation migrants in the general/academic pro-
grams). Model 1 shows that selective migration is positively associated with the size
of the regression coefficient of ethnic background. More selectively migrated
communities have higher likelihoods to be enrolled in the academic tracks in upper
secondary education. This is in line with hypothesis 1. The MIPEX index is
positively associated with the ethnicity slope, indicating higher levels of ethnic
advantage (or lower disadvantage) in societies with more migrant-friendly policies.
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Table 2 Multilevel regression coefficients of selectivity of migration, language similarity, and desti-
nation country institutions on the level of ethnic inequality in three educational outcomesa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net ethnic gap in student test scores
Selective migration index 0.311*** 0.174** 0.297 0.136* - 0.042
(3.39) (2.67) (0.58) (1.82) (- 0.59)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
0.159 0.258* 0.257* 0.113 0.118









Tracking index - 0.187** - 0.180**
(- 2.87) (- 2.85)




Constant - 0.173 - 1.186** - 1.193*** - 0.230* - 0.231*
(- 1.10) (- 3.25) (- 3.32) (- 1.76) (- 1.80)
Variance between countries 3.08e-23 5.00e-23*** 1.25e-24 7.61e-17*** 8.25e-23
(- 0.38) (- 7.28) (- 0.29) (- 5.96) (- 0.26)
Variance between ethnic
groups within countries
0.146*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.112***
(- 3.91) (- 8.68) (- 5.55) (- 4.90) (- 4.04)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80
Net ethnic gap in academic versus vocational track
Selective migration index 0.727*** 0.727*** - 1.071* 0.727*** 0.610***
(7.12) (7.09) (- 1.75) (7.09) (5.58)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.055 - 0.054 - 0.044 - 0.055 - 0.050









Tracking index - 0.095*** - 0.088**
(- 3.55) (- 3.22)




Constant 0.219** - 0.317 - 0.219 0.222*** 0.223***
(3.00) (- 1.38) (- 0.89) (4.68) (4.42)
Variance between countries 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(- 6.95) (- 18.95) (- 17.69) (- 8.14) (- 8.22)
Variance between ethnic
groups within countries
0.047*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(- 22.81) (- 22.72) (- 20.12) (- 22.72) (- 22.73)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
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Model 3 shows that selective migration is even more positively associated with
minorities’ opportunities in education in countries with favorable migrant integra-
tion policies. In other words, migration integration policies are particularly helpful
for communities that are strongly positively selected, which goes against hypothesis
2. One interpretation of this finding may be that favorable integration policies are
particularly helpful for positively selected groups with high aspirations. It is easier
for them to take advantage of the opportunities available in favorable integration
regimes.
Model 4 shows that early tracking is associated with larger disadvantages (or
smaller advantages) of ethnic minorities relative to majority populations with regard
to upper secondary academic enrollment. So, in countries where tracking happens
earlier and more rigidly at the first stage of secondary education, there is a weaker
overrepresentation of second-generation immigrants in the academic schools at the
upper secondary level. This finding corresponds to the multination comparison of
student achievements at age 15 (Cobb-Clark et al. 2012), but is now further
Table 2 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net ethnic gap in completion of upper secondary education
Selective migration index 0.184 0.184 1.187 0.184 - 0.457
(0.97) (0.97) (1.13) (0.97) (- 0.71)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.094* - 0.094* - 0.100* - 0.094* - 0.073
(- 1.89) (- 1.89) (- 2.00) (- 1.89) (- 1.35)
Migrant integration policy
(MIPEX/10)
- 0.068 - 0.058
(- 1.22) (- 1.09)




Tracking index - 0.177*** - 0.162**
(- 3.64) (- 3.20)




Constant 0.080 0.530* 0.459 - 0.002 - 0.004
(0.76) (1.68) (1.56) (- 0.04) (- 0.08)
Variance between countries 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.027*** 0.023***
(- 6.87) (- 5.06) (- 5.11) (- 5.96) (- 6.35)
Variance between ethnic
groups within countries
0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051***
(- 7.45) (- 7.46) (- 7.82) (- 7.46) (- 7.90)
Observations 57 57 57 57 57
t statistics in parentheses
*p\ 0.10; *p\ 0.05; **p\ 0.01; ***p\ 0.001
aThe unit of observation is migrant group within destination country
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supported using post-harmonized educational cohort data for an outcome at the
upper secondary level.
Model 5 shows that tracking is particularly harmful to students coming from
more strongly selected migrant communities. Like with student test scores, this is in
support of hypothesis 3b, which argues that tracking is particularly harmful to
ambitious and motivated migrant communities.
The third panel of Table 2 shows results on the completion of full upper
secondary education (in any track). Overall, the results are less strong than in the
previous analyses, possibly because different datasets have been used, and fewer
countries could be included (see ‘‘Appendix 2’’). For instance, for the Netherlands,
we now have to rely on the educational attainment of young adults in a cross-
sectional survey, while for previous analysis, we used prospective educational
cohort data. Also for Britain, other data are used.
There is no significant association between selective migration and secondary
degree completion, although the coefficient is positive as in previous analyses.
Model 2 shows that migrant integration policies are not associated with secondary
degree completion. So, while the previous panel showed a positive association with
the enrollment into academic forms of secondary education, we do not see that this
translates into lower inequalities in terms of the completion of secondary education.
The coefficient for the migrant integration policy index is unrelated to the selectivity
of migrant communities (model 3).8
Model 4 shows that early tracking magnifies the ethnic educational inequalities in
secondary degree completion. So, like with test scores and the choice for the
academic track, tracking is associated with larger ethnic gaps. Model 5 shows that
the interaction term between tracking and selectivity is negative, as with the
previous two dependent variables, but in this case, the association is not statistically
significant.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
We studied ethnic educational inequalities among second-generation migrants in ten
destination countries, concerning three crucial outcomes in educational careers: test
results, choosing the academic or vocational route in upper secondary education,
and the completion of upper secondary education. With our career perspective on
ethnic inequalities in education, holding constant for socioeconomic differences
between groups, we examine whether ‘context matters’ for the integration and
assimilation of migrant children in the secondary educational system.
Building on the perspective that ethnic communities are defined based on the
combination of the country of origin and the country of destination of migrants (Van
Tubergen et al. 2004), our focus was on the question whether selective migration of
a migrant group relative to the non-migrating ‘home stayers’ is related to the level
8 A replication on only European countries (Table 7 of Appendix) showed a negative association
between migrant integration policies and the slope for migration background, indicating stronger
disadvantages in countries with more migrant-friendly policies.
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of disadvantage in education. We found support for the baseline hypothesis that
more positively selected migrant communities have lower levels of disadvantage (or
a higher level of advantage) relative to the majority population. This effect was only
found to be statistically significant for the standardized tests taken at the first stage
of secondary education and for the choice of academic versus vocational education.
For secondary school completion, the effect of selectivity of migration was more
modest and had higher levels of statistical uncertainty. Possibly, differences across
educational outcomes imply that the ethnic community seems more important for
educational outcomes in the early school career than for outcomes later in the
career.
We also examined whether selective migration was differentially associated with
ethnic disadvantage in education depending on host country institutions, in
particular migrant-friendly policies and the early tracking of the system. First of
all, it appeared that ‘context matters’ in that the minority–majority education gaps
were associated with these institutional characteristics. Gaps were less negative for
minority students (or more positive, as the net ethnic gaps are often favorable for the
second generation when socioeconomic differences are taken into account) in
societies with migrant-friendly policies—again with the exception of the likelihood
to complete upper secondary education. Gaps were more negative (or less positive)
in societies with strongly tracked educational systems, and consistent so for all
studied outcomes. However, the evidence that these institutional environments had
differential associations with ethnic inequalities depending on the selectivity of
migration is less clear. If anything, we see that tracking in education is particularly
harmful to positively selected immigrant communities, but the effect is not robust to
specific country selections. In terms of policy implications, the ‘warmth of the
welcome’ and the tracking of the system seem to matter, but there is, based on our
findings, little reason to think that these institutional characteristics matter
differently depending on the migrant group’s selectivity.
Our focus on tracking does not mean that this is the only form of school
segregation that may impact children of immigrants disproportionately. Other forms
of segregation may be manifested through residential segregation, or through private
schools as apparent in the USA and England. Nevertheless, the private sector only
includes around 10 percent of primary and secondary school children in the USA
(McFarland et al. 2017) and 9 percent in England (Department for Education 2016),
while academic/general tracks typically have an intake of around 40–50% of
students. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to further study the impact of private
education on students of different migration backgrounds.
This study’s findings are important for at least three fields of investigation. First
of all, while there are many studies that have aimed to explain the extent to which
migrant communities are positively selected based on human capital, few studies
have examined the implications for the level of ethnic educational inequality,
let alone inequalities at various stages of the educational career. Showing the
implications of selectivity of migration further emphasizes the relevance of studying
the migration process itself. As a follow-up to our study, a multi-origin-multi-
destination design can also examine the educational distribution in the home country
in a different way. As Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) show, the educational attainment
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of immigrants may also be seen as a positional good, where a medium-level
qualification may in fact represent a comparatively high achievement level,
depending on the origin country.
Second, our study has contributed to the understanding of ethnic educational
inequalities, by emphasizing the relevance of the context of reception. The observed
level of selectivity of migration is a consequence of two joint processes: (1)
selectivity of who migrates and (2) the choice of country to migrate to. This makes
that we have to be careful to think of the associations of selective migration as
causal. Nevertheless, given that the destination of migrants is at least partially a
non-rational random process, it is worthwhile to study context in relation to
selectivity of migration. Moreover, if an optimal sorting process would have
occurred, no differential effects would have been found as each community would
have ended up in the best host country. Nevertheless, a possible weakness of our
design is that our findings may result from ethnic communities being conducive to
educational attainment of children on top of individual socioeconomic background,
while selective migration has no causal effect on a counterfactual interpretation of
what would have happened had migration not taken place.
A third field of enquiry to which our study speaks is concerned with the impact of
the educational institutional structure on various inequalities. While most of the
literature on educational systems is concerned with social, rather than ethnic,
inequalities (Brunello and Checchi 2007; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010), some
studies have pointed to larger ethnic inequalities in early tracked educational
systems (Cobb-Clark et al. 2012, Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Our data found
evidence for this as well, studying multiple educational outcomes. For all three
educational outcomes, ethnic minorities were further disadvantaged in societies
with early tracking systems (cf. Griga and Hadjar 2014 for tertiary education).
Moreover, early tracking was particularly harmful to strongly positively selected
ethnic communities. Tracking thus seems to harm the educational potential
specifically of highly motivated and ambitious ethnic groups.
In summary, selectivity of migration appeared a relevant correlate of the
educational performance differentials between the second generation and majority
populations. Although our data do not contain measurements of aspirations and
motivations, these offer relevant interpretations of this central finding. Positively
selected migrant groups do better in education than migrant groups that have been
less positively selected. Migrants are, according to the immigrant optimism thesis of
Kao and Tienda (1995), anxious and motivated to integrate in their new country, and
their optimism stimulates their children’s schooling outcomes. This particularly
affects ethnic communities that form a positive selection of their origin country’s
population in terms of human capital.
Finally, it is worth mentioning some weaknesses of our study. With our approach
to select the best possible data per country, each with sizeable immigrant
communities, we had to harmonize the data after data collection, which always
comes at a cost with regard to comparability. One disbalance is that the countries
differed in the number of immigrant groups that were included. It is possible that
our results are partly driven by the countries with many immigrant groups, most
notably Sweden. Another disadvantage of post-harmonization is that some datasets
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are longitudinal and others are not. Also, our two-step design required many ‘cases,’
necessitating us to combine all countries and all origin countries. Robustness checks
with fewer countries sometimes refuted the overall findings, but particularly with
regard to the interaction of destination country institutions by selectivity of
migration. Finally, our approach to measure selective migration conflates selection
processes in the decision to migrate and the destination where to move. Our study
can be seen as complementary to studies that more specifically address these joint
decisions in the migration process (Grogger and Hanson 2011; Guveli et al. 2016).
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Table 3 Ethnic groups by country
Number of
ethnic groups
Ethnic groups studied per outcome variablea
Belgium 5 Outcomes 1, 2, 3
Italian, Turkish, North African, other, mixed
Canada 9 Outcomes 1 and 3
Western Europe, Southern Europe, Chinese, South East Asian,
South Asian, Caribbean, Filipino, other, mixed
England 8 Outcomes 1, 2, 3
Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Caribbean, Sub-Saharan African,
Bangladesh, other, mixed
Finland 8 Outcomes 1, 2
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Ex-Yugoslavian, East Asian,
sub-Saharan African, North African, other, mixed
France 6 Outcomes 1, 2, 3
Iberian, Caribbean, Sub-Saharan African, North African, other,
mixed
Germany 8 Outcomes 1, 3
Southern European, Italy, Polish, Ex-Yugoslavian, Former Soviet
Union, Turkish, other, mixed
The Netherlands 4 Outcomes 1, 3
Turkish, Caribbean, North African, other
Outcome 3
Turkish, Caribbean, North African
Sweden 21 Outcomes 1, 2, 3
Western European, Finnish, Danish, Norwegian, Southern
European, Eastern European, Polish, Ex-Yugoslavian, East
Asian, South East Asian, South Asian, West Asian, Iranian,
Iraqi, Turkish, Sub-Saharan African, North African, South
American, Chilean, Africa’s Horn, mixed
Switzerland 7 Outcome 1
Italian, Iberian, Eastern European, Ex-Yugoslavian, Turkish,
other, mixed
USA 5 Outcomes 1, 3
Western European, East Asian, Puerto Rican, Mexican, other,
mixed
aOutcome 1: Student test scores, Outcome 2: Vocational or academic track within upper secondary
education, Outcome 3: Completion of upper secondary education




Table 4 Microdata that have been used in the first step of the analysis







Belgium PISA 2003 Matched observations from Belgian census of
1991 (parental education, social class,
ethnicity) and 2001 (educational outcomes)
Britain Longitudinal Study (linked
census and vital event data of
1% of population of England
and Wales),1991–2001
Youth Cohort Study
cohort 10 sweep1 (2000)
Longitudinal Study
1991–2001
Canada Youth in Transition Survey 2000 N/A Youth in
Transition
Survey 2000
France Panel 95 (Secondary school cohort data)
Finland Linked register data (Statistics Finland) N/A




The Netherlands VOCL 1999 (Secondary school cohort data) Survey Integration
of Minorities
(SIM) 2006
Sweden STAR database (Linked register data)
Switzerland PISA 2000 N/A N/A





N/A No data have been analyzed on this outcome for this country
Table 5 Selective migration index per ethnic group and destination country








Canada West European UK ESS 2002 0.194962
Finland West European UK ESS 2002 0.066658
Sweden West European UK ESS 2002 - 0.20931
USA West European UK ESS 2002 0.11142
Sweden Finnish Finland ESS 2002 - 0.26169
Sweden Danish Denmark ISSP 2000 - 0.18047
Sweden Norwegian Norway ESS 2002 - 0.27216
Canada South European Portugal ESS 2002 0.209518
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Table 5 continued








Germany South European Greece ESS 2002 - 0.18499
Sweden South European Italy ESS 2002/04/06 pooled - 0.18499
Germany Italian Italy ESS 2002-04-06
(pooled)
- 0.29638
Switzerland Italian Italy ESS pooled - 0.14623
Belgium Italian Italy ESS pooled - 0.49736
France Iberian Portugal ESS 2002 - 0.15283
Switzerland Iberian Portugal ESS 2002 - 0.02143
Finland East European Estonia ISSP 2009 - 0.04595
Sweden East European Hungary ISSP 2000 & ESS 2002
(pooled)
0.05488
Switzerland East European Albania EVS 2008 0.037072
Germany Polish Poland Pisa 2006 0.141243
Sweden Polish Poland ESS 2007 0.18756
Finland Ex-Yugoslavia Croatia ESS 2007 0.063322
Germany Ex-Yugoslavia Croatia ESS 2007 - 0.04651
Sweden Ex-Yugoslavia Bosnia BiH - 0.19434
Switzerland Ex-Yugoslavia Croatia ESS 2007 - 0.03873
Germany Former Soviet
Union
Russia ISSP 2000 0.135678
Finland East Asian China WVS 2–5 0.001543
Sweden East Asian China WVS 2–5 0.210098
USA East Asian China WVS 2–5 0.663011
Canada Chinese China WVS 2–5 0.652187
England Chinese China WVS 2–5 0.154286
Canada South East Asian Vietnam WVS 4–5 0.663362
Sweden South East Asian Vietnam WVS 4–5 - 0.0254
Canada South Asian India SDSA 0.69034
Sweden South Asian India SDSA 0.262061
England Indian India SDSA 0.209051
England Pakistani Pakistan SDSA 0.074064
Sweden West Asian Turkey ESS 2007–2008 0.188775
Sweden Iranian Iran WVS 4–5 0.312045
Sweden Iraqi Iraq WVS 4–5 0.26471
Belgium Turkish Turkey ESS 2007–08 - 0.13527
Germany Turkish Turkey ESS 2007–08 0.329437
The Netherlands Turkish Turkey ESS 2007–08 - 0.07772
Sweden Turkish Turkey ESS 2007–08 0.1133
Switzerland Turkish Turkey ESS 2007–08 0.323408
Canada Caribbean Jamaica LAPOP 2010 0.472845
England Caribbean Jamaica LAPOP 2010 - 0.08323




Table 6 Model estimates restricted to countries for which all three dependent variables are available
(Belgium, Canada, England, France, the Netherlands, Sweden)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net ethnic gap in student test scores
Selective migration index 0.188 0.122 - 0.095 0.035 0.375*
(1.47) (1.63) (- 0.20) (0.36) (1.66)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.030 - 0.053 - 0.050 - 0.035 - 0.044
(- 0.40) (- 0.50) (- 0.46) (- 0.51) (- 0.64)
Table 5 continued











The Netherlands Caribbean Suriname LAPOP 2010 0.112146
USA Puerto Rico Puerto Rico WVS 3–4 - 0.064
England Sub-Saharan
Africa
Nigeria Afrobarometer 4 0.339071
Finland Sub-Saharan
Africa
Senegal Afrobarometer 4 0.535145
France Sub-Saharan
Africa
Senegal Afrobarometer 4 0.158402
Sweden Sub-Saharan
Africa
Senegal Afrobarometer 4 0.678733
Canada Sub-Saharan
Africa
Nigeria Afrobarometer 4 0.606676
Belgium North African Morocco WVS 3–4 &
Afrobarometer
0.179418
Finland North African Algeria WVS 4 0.213563
France North African Algeria WVS 4 - 0.30408
The Netherlands North African Morocco WVS 3–4 &
Afrobarometer
- 0.01006
Sweden North African Algeria WVS 4 0.16425
Sweden South American Argentina ISSP 2009 0.250326
Canada South American No data
Sweden Chilean Chile ISSP 2000–9 (pooled) 0.168185
USA Mexican Mexico ISSP 2000 - 0.2437
Canada Filipino Philippines ISSP 2000–9 (pooled) 0.64454
England Bangladesh Bangladesh SDSA - 0.01309
Sweden Horn of Africa Tanzania (proxy) Afrobarometer 1 0.589518
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Table 6 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrant integration policy
(MIPEX/10)
- 0.001 - 0.004
(- 0.03) (- 0.09)




Tracking index - 0.158*** - 0.172***
(- 3.62) (- 4.28)




Constant - 0.075 0.052 0.068 - 0.079* - 0.086*
(- 0.80) (0.13) (0.18) (- 1.67) (- 1.95)
Variance between countries 0.040*** 3.09e-23 1.13e-23 1.11e-24 2.26e-23
(- 4.54) (- 0.22) (- 0.26) (- 0.24) (- 0.31)
Variance between ethnic groups
within countries
0.043*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.046***
(- 14.98) (- 4.68) (- 4.74) (- 5.59) (- 5.88)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52
Net ethnic gap in academic versus vocational track
Selective migration index 0.739*** 0.738*** - 1.637*** 0.738*** 0.427
(6.29) (6.20) (- 3.57) (6.20) (0.51)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.090 - 0.088 - 0.061 - 0.089 - 0.071









Tracking index - 0.115** - 0.104*
(- 3.16) (- 2.37)




Constant 0.253** - 0.167 - 0.0555 0.238*** 0.240***
(2.79) (- 0.90) (- 0.29) (4.48) (4.13)
Variance between countries 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(- 6.79) (- 15.16) (- 13.95) (- 10.46) (- 10.71)
Variance between ethnic groups
within countries
0.045*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(- 28.12) (- 27.90) (- 18.81) (- 27.91) (- 37.52)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44
Net ethnic gap in completion of upper secondary education
Selective migration index - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.383 - 0.002 0.143
(- 0.04) (- 0.04) (- 0.83) (- 0.04) (0.21)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.101 - 0.101 - 0.097 - 0.101 - 0.110
(- 1.16) (- 1.16) (- 1.08) (- 1.16) (- 1.23)




Table 7 Model estimates restricted to European countries (excluding Canada and the USA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net ethnic gap in student test scores
Selective migration index 0.086 0.101 - 0.246 0.124 - 0.009
(0.55) (1.34) (- 0.70) (1.38) (- 0.11)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
0.104 0.335** 0.336** 0.187 0.195









Tracking index - 0.175* - 0.166*
(- 2.40) (- 2.31)




Constant - 0.220* - 1.344*** - 1.319*** - 0.257* - 0.261*
(- 2.27) (- 5.55) (- 5.19) (- 1.76) (- 1.79)
Table 6 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrant integration policy
(MIPEX/10)
- 0.057 - 0.059
(- 0.95) (- 0.97)




Tracking index - 0.204** - 0.210**
(- 2.81) (- 2.79)




Constant 0.089 0.465 0.482 0.023 0.027
(0.61) (1.33) (1.35) (0.31) (0.35)
Variance between countries 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.034*** 0.036***
(- 5.46) (- 4.39) (- 4.33) (- 5.34) (- 5.26)
Variance between ethnic groups
within countries
0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(- 22.49) (- 22.38) (- 21.41) (- 22.38) (- 22.77)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52
t statistics in parentheses
*p\ 0.10; *p\ 0.05; **p\ 0.01; ***p\ 0.001
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Table 7 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variance between countries 0.060*** 1.61e-20*** 1.40e-23 1.34e-23 1.31e-23
(- 4.84) (- 4.47) (- 0.35) (- 0.23) (- 0.25)
Variance between ethnic groups
within countries
0.067*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.126*** 0.123***
(- 14.59) (- 8.41) (- 5.48) (- 3.70) (- 3.77)
Observations 66 66 66 66 66
Net ethnic gap in academic versus vocational track
Selective migration index 0.727*** 0.727*** - 1.071* 0.727*** 0.610***
(7.12) (7.09) (- 1.75) (7.09) (5.58)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.055 - 0.054 - 0.044 - 0.055 - 0.050









Tracking index - 0.095*** - 0.088**
(- 3.55) (- 3.22)




Constant 0.219** - 0.317 - 0.219 0.222*** 0.223***
(3.00) (- 1.38) (- 0.89) (4.68) (4.42)
Variance between countries 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(- 6.95) (- 18.95) (- 17.69) (- 8.14) (- 8.22)
Variance between ethnic groups
within countries
0.047*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(- 22.81) (- 22.72) (- 20.12) (- 22.72) (- 22.73)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
Net ethnic gap in completion of upper secondary education
Selective migration index - 0.028 - 0.028 - 0.583* - 0.028 0.238
(- 0.66) (- 0.66) (- 2.36) (- 0.66) (0.35)
Same language in origin and
destination countries
- 0.078 - 0.078 - 0.071 - 0.078 - 0.093
(- 0.83) (- 0.83) (- 0.73) (- 0.83) (- 0.96)
Migrant integration policy
(MIPEX/10)
- 0.111* - 0.115*
(- 2.12) (- 2.17)




Tracking index - 0.129* - 0.133*
(- 2.18) (- 2.12)




Constant - 0.017 0.706* 0.734* - 0.033 - 0.031
(- 0.15) (1.86) (1.91) (- 0.44) (- 0.40)
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